Break it,
keep the pot.

We built a post-quantum chain and red-teamed it until every attack we could invent bounced off. So here is real money that says it holds — sitting in the open, on live mainnet, with no permission gate. Take it if you can.

The steal-the-pot

A public account. No published key.

The account below holds a real balance on SOV mainnet. Its private key is never published and never leaves cold storage. The only way to move the coins is to break the chain — forge a signature, mint from nothing, rewrite consensus, crack the transport, or find a flaw nobody has. Whatever you drain, you keep. No sign-up, no rules lawyer: the ledger is the referee.

—XUS

FUNDING

pot account
8d670310fc5618e1cf1f8fe6548d2c76bdf9c22b1da594d7eb49f8ecbfa1953a

live · mainnet tip height — · balance read straight from the chain

Target pot: 500 XUS. The number above is the account's actual on-chain balance, refreshed every 20 seconds — when it hits zero after funding, someone won (or the maintainer swept it). It is genuinely spendable: if a real hole exists, it really is gone.

How to play

Run a node from source (or grab a release binary) and join mainnet — the two seed relays bootstrap you.
Attack the real thing: consensus (produce_block / import_block), the hybrid signatures (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65), the transport (Noise-XX + ML-KEM-768), the shielded pool (Orchard/Halo2), or the node's RPC / P2P surface.
If you can author a transaction the network accepts that moves the pot — or otherwise make the coins yours — they're yours. Sweep them to your own address.
Tell us how (email) so we can fix it and credit you. Keeping the coins is not conditional on disclosing — but eternal glory is.

Honest scope. The in-house red team runs 19 in-process consensus attacks, a 17-probe live RPC front-door battery, a hostile-peer P2P back-door, and a funded double-spend/theft campaign — all defended (source in the repo under chain/crates/redteam). This is the open version of that: your attacks, our money. We cannot run Shor's or Grover's or forge BLAKE3 — nobody can — so the claim is that the chain fails closed against everything a real adversary can actually do today.

The bug bounty

Can't drain the pot, but found a flaw?

Not every serious bug lets you steal the pot directly — a consensus edge case, a node crash that partitions the network, a shielded-pool privacy leak, a mempool wedge. Report those responsibly and get paid in XUS by severity. This track is paid from the project's mined reserve at the maintainer's discretion; the numbers below are indicative.

Severity	What it looks like	Reward
Critical	Forge/mint value, steal another account's funds, break signature or transport crypto, halt or split the chain at will.	up to 500 XUS + the pot
High	Remote node crash or memory-exhaustion, a reproducible consensus divergence, a shielded-pool linkability break.	100–250 XUS
Medium	RPC/mempool denial of service, a sync stall an attacker can trigger, an account nonce wedge.	25–75 XUS
Low	Info leak, robustness gap, a defense that's weaker than documented.	recognition + tip

In scope

consensus / STFPoW & difficultyhybrid signaturesNoise + ML-KEM transportshielded poolnode P2P & syncJSON-RPCmempoolwallet key handling

Out of scope

the steal-the-pot itself (that's the CTF)DoS on a single 2 GB relaysocial engineeringspam / rate-limit testsalready-known itemsthe website

Report it

Email a clear write-up + proof of concept to security@sovxus.com. Include the commit hash, repro steps, and where to send the reward. Good-faith research is authorized — attack your own nodes and the public mainnet, don't attack other people's wallets or the seed operators' boxes. We aim to acknowledge within a few days.

Report a bug Read the source White paper

Break it,keep the pot.